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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates how investments in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities affect 
firm value. We categorise firms’ CSR activities as strategic or opportunistic based on consistency, 
and analyse the differential value relevance effect. We use the Egyptian Economic Justice Index 
(EEJI) as the most representative measure for firms' CSR activities in Egypt. To measure valuation 
effect, we adopt an earnings response coefficient (ERC) model. Our main explanatory variables 
are interaction variables with unexpected earnings and two dummy variables; one indicating CSR 
activities, and one indicating their consistency. We document these variables as positively and 
negatively significant. Our findings show that investing in CSR activities consistently and 
strategically may increase firm's profitability and firm value. However, firms that sporadically 
invest in CSR activities show a smaller relationship between unexpected earnings and stock 
returns than firms that consistently invest in CSR activities. 
 
Keywords: Agency Costs, Earnings Response Coefficients, CSR Activities, Firm Value, Strategic and 
Opportunistic activities 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper examines how the investment behaviour 
of firms in corporate social responsibility (CSR) is 
related to firm value. Consistent with previous 
studies (Hemingway and Maclagan, 2004; Barnea and 
Rubin, 2010; Pathirawasam and Wickremasinghe, 
2012; Kostyuk et al., 2013; Pozzoli and Romolini, 
2013; Uddin, 2015), we argue that if firms invest in 
CSR opportunistically or managers invest in CSR 
ceremonially, that is, to serve their own interests, 
CSR may decrease the firm value instead of 
increasing it. Investing in CSR in this setting 
mobilises firms’ valuable economic resources in 
activities which are not related to firms’ profitable 
projects (Barnea and Rubin, 2010). However, if firms 
invest in CSR strategically, that is, consistently and 
in the best interest of the firms,  the firm value is 
likely to increase, because strategic investments in 
CRS potentially create goodwill, such as a good 
product image, which attracts more consumers to 
the firm (Brown and Dacin, 1997), and can improve 
future profitability (Waddock and Graves, 1997; 
Banker and Mashruwala, 2007; Qiu et al., 2016). For 
example, corporate giving can create goodwill by 
enhancing employee morale, improving customer 
loyalty and creating a favourable impression for 
government officials and regulators (Brown et al., 
2006). Such firms are likely to attract and retain 
highly talented employees (Edmans, 2011) and 
decrease lawsuits and environmental costs (Dhaliwal 
et al., 2012). Research has shown that firms with 
positive cash-flows and low debts are more likely to 
invest strategically and consistently in CSR than 
firms with financial difficulties or that operate in 
flawed stock markets (Dhaliwal et al., 2012; Seo et 
al., 2015). This raises the question of how investing 
in CSR affects the firm value for companies 
operating in developing countries, an issue that has 
attracted less attention in academic research with a 
positivistic tradition (Momin and Parker, 2013).The 
aim of this paper is to address this gap by analysing 
cases in which investing in CSR improves, or 
alternatively decreases, firm value by using data 
from a developing country. 
Using quantitative data based on 1,862 firm-
years listed in the Egyptian Stock Market between 
2009 and 2014, we compare the earnings response 
coefficients, hereinafter referred to as ERC, (Collins 
& Kothari, 1989) of firms investing in CSR activities 
and other firms that do not invest in CSR activities 
to examine how firms’ CSR activities affect firm 
value in general. We also compare the ERC of firms 
with strategic and consistent CSR activities, with 
those of firms with inconsistent CSR activities, to 
examine the effect of consistency of CSR activities 
on firm value. As expected, we find that firms with 
CSR activities show higher ERC than firms without 
or low level CSR activities. This finding implies that 
investing in CSR activities strategically and 
consistently increases firm value in general. 
However, the ERC of firms that sporadically and 
opportunistically invest in CSR activities is smaller 
than that of firms investing in CSR activities 
consistently. This finding implies that consistent 
investments in CSR activities may increase earnings 
continuously, while sporadic investments in CSR 
activities may hurt firm earnings and thereby firm 
value. These findings are robust due to different 
measures of investments in CSR activities, such as 
the pattern in and variance of the level of CSR 
activities. 
Our research makes the following 
contributions. First, our paper adds to the empirical 
evidence concerning the general effect of investing 
in CSR activities on firms’ earnings and stock 
returns. Second, we explain the inconsistent findings 
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in previous studies regarding the relationship 
between firms’ investment behaviour in CSR 
activities and differential implications on firm value. 
Third, our research findings confirm that investors 
consider the investment behaviour of firms in CSR 
activities when making their capital budgeting 
decisions. Fourth, managers and practitioners can 
use our findings in making strategic decisions on 
when and how to invest in CSR activities. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next 
section provides a literature review and explains our 
hypothesis. Section 3 explains research 
methodology, variable measurement and sample 
data. Section 4 shows descriptive statistics and 
empirical results of our multiple regression. Section 
5 explains sensitivity tests of the main results. 
Section 6 summarises our findings and conclusions. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Davis (1960) defines CSR as businessmen’s decisions 
and actions taken for reasons that are, at least 
partially, beyond the firm’s direct economic or 
technical interest. Friedman (1970) argues however, 
that the only and ultimate responsibility of firms is 
to maximise profit; CSR may decrease a firm’s value 
because it involves expenses that are unnecessary 
for the firm to operate. This argument suggests that 
CSR activities may involve costs not directly related 
to revenue generating activities, which might 
decrease firm value. Since the early 1950s, decisions 
surrounding investment in CSR activities have 
attracted researchers and practitioners with 
different backgrounds. For example, Bowen (1953) 
argues that managers have obligations to adopt 
policies and make decisions that are desirable from 
the perspectives of societal goals and values as a 
whole. Since then, scholars have developed and 
applied the concept of CSR in various settings, such 
as reporting on the environmental and social 
activities of firms (Kostyuk et al., 2013; De Villiers 
and Alexander, 2014; Michelon et al., 2015) and the 
effects of environmental and social activities on the 
financial performance of firms (Pozzoli and 
Romolini, 2013; Qiu et al., 2016). Firms have started 
to disclose their CSR activities voluntarily because 
investors, customers, and other stakeholders have 
shown interest in businesses that are green and 
societally friendly (KimPark and Wier, 2012). 
Many studies have conceptualised CSR 
activities as agency costs and have documented 
negative relationships between financial 
performance metrics and costs of CSR activities 
(Brown et al., 2006). Managers can decide to invest in 
CSR to improve their personal interests (Barnea and 
Rubin, 2010). Corporate giving may enhance the 
reputations of managers or directors in their social 
circles and provide them with other benefits at 
shareholders’ expense. If the cost of giving is not 
offset by reductions in managerial compensation, 
giving represents an agency cost that may decrease 
firm value (Brown et al., 2006). Wright and Ferris 
(1997) have shown that public firms that disinvested 
business units in South Africa because of political 
reasons, had significantly negative stock market 
returns around the date of the disinvestment 
decision. This finding suggests that when under 
political pressure, managers can make decisions that 
decrease the firm value. Using British data, Brammer 
and Millington (2006) found negative relationships 
between three CSR indicators that measure 
contributions to the environment, employment and 
community, and stock returns. Brammer and 
Millington's (2006) findings suggest that firms that 
contribute least to community show the highest 
stock returns, which implies that investing in CSR 
activities affects the firm value negatively. Brown et 
al. (2006) argue that agency costs play a prominent 
role in explaining corporate giving, because firms 
with a large board of directors are likely to give 
more money or establish foundations, whereas firms 
with high debts show a lower level of philanthropic 
acts. In consequence, Brown et al. (2006) argue that 
managers and board members can increase their 
own utility through corporate philanthropy. 
Similarly, Barnea and Rubin (2010) argue that 
managers and large shareholders overinvest in CSR 
activities for private benefits, such as enhancing 
personal reputation and increasing self-satisfaction. 
They analysed the relationship between CSR 
activities, financial structure and ownership of the 
firms, and found a negative relation between inside 
ownership and CSR. Brown et al.'s (2006) research 
suggests that managers and/or large shareholders 
increase philanthropic spending when inside 
ownership is low, because they obtain relatively 
bigger private benefits from firms’ philanthropic 
behaviour at low or no personal cost. They also 
found that leverage is significantly negatively 
correlated with CSR, which implies that CSR related 
expenditure is more likely to reflect agency costs. 
Many other studies have found no significant 
correlation between CSR and financial performances 
(Aupperle et al., 1985; McWilliams and Siegel, 2000; 
Teoh and Wong, 1993; Nelling and Webb, 2009). 
Aupperle et al. (1985) do not find a significant 
correlation between Return of Assets (ROA) and 
CEO’s orientation toward social responsibilities. 
Teoh and Wong (1993) examine market reactions to 
the shareholders boycott of South Africa due to race 
discrimination and found no significant market 
reactions. McWilliams and Siegel (2000) and Nelling 
and Webb (2009) confirm that there is no significant 
correlation between CSR and financial performances 
as documented in Waddock and Graves (1997) after 
adding control variables and using time series fixed 
effect regression models to analyse similar empirical 
data. These results suggest that CSR may not have 
any impact on firms’ profitability or value. 
In contrast, many other previous studies have 
shown that CSR activities enhance the image and 
reputation of firms, which could lead to favourable 
treatment from regulatory agencies, improve the 
preference for firms’ products, boost employee 
morale, help to recruit talented employees (Brown 
and Dacin, 1997; Landon and Smith, 1997), and 
eventually increase firms’ profitability (Banker and 
Mashruwala, 2007; Edmans, 2011). CSR activities 
also improve production efficiency and reduce 
operational uncertainties through the reduction of 
lawsuit, environmental costs and equity costs 
(Dhaliwal et al., 2011; 2012). Kahneman et al. (1986) 
argue that consumers, suppliers, and employees care 
about being treated fairly and treating others fairly 
and are willing to resist unfair firms at cost to 
themselves, and satisfying fairness constraints may 
lead to better long-term financial performance based 
on survey evidence which supports the causal link 
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between CSR and financial performance. Because 
company image or reputation is created over time, 
firms that invest in CSR activities consistently over a 
long-term are more likely to show better financial 
performance (Dhaliwal et al., 2011). Pava and Krausz 
(1996) argue that socially responsible firms show 
slightly better long-term financial performance than 
other firms. Posnikoff (1997) investigates the market 
reactions of U.S firms that disclosed disinvestment 
or withdrawal from South Africa, using event study 
methodology. Contrary to Wright and Ferris (1997) 
who also examined the market reactions of firms 
that disinvested from South Africa, he finds 
significant positive market reactions during the 
event period. Waddock and Graves (1997) investigate 
the association and causality between CSR and 
subsequent accounting returns such as ROA, ROE, 
and ROS. Their findings show that CSR is 
significantly positively related to past accounting 
returns, suggesting that firms with good financial 
performance in the past invest more resources in 
CSR. Further, they document that CSR is also 
positively related to future accounting returns, 
indicating that CSR activities may improve firm 
images and thereby affect the future performance of 
firms. Landon and Smith (1997) examine firms in the 
Bordeaux Wine industry and find that consumers 
consider market reputation to be much more 
important than product quality, implying that 
financial performance could be improved with CSR 
which could enhance the image of firms. Roberts 
and Dowling (2002) also document that firms with 
good reputations maintain better financial 
performance over a long-term period. 
These results suggest that as CSR can improve 
a firm’s reputation, consistent investment in CSR 
can improve financial performance. Chang (2010) 
also document the positive relation between CSR, 
measured by Korean economic justice index, and 
financial performances such as ROA and Tobin’s q. 
The results of these studies suggest CSR may 
enhance firm image, which leads to increase in 
accounting returns, and eventually positively affect 
financial performance and firm value. These 
evidences suggest that spending on CSR activities 
improves non-financial performance and ultimately 
will be helpful to increase financial performance and 
firm value (Dhaliwal, 2012; Pozzoli and Romolini, 
2013; Kostyuk et al., 2013). 
As shown above, previous studies show that 
CSR could increase financial performances or firm 
value in some cases and might not affect or could 
even decrease financial performances. In this study 
we seek an explanation regarding the mixed results 
regarding the relationship between CSR activities 
and firm value. When firms or managers engage in 
opportunistic CSR activities, firm value may not 
increase or may even decrease because the benefits 
of CSR may not adequately improve firm reputation 
to compensate for the cost of CSR and/or may 
enhance only managers’ reputation rather than firm 
reputation. Because a firm’s CSR activities may not 
improve firm image, the firm’s future earnings are 
not likely to be increased by CSR and therefore 
current earnings change does not offer more 
information about firms’ profitability than usual. 
When firms engage opportunistically in CSR, they 
are more likely to do sosporadically, rather than 
consistently, because those CSR activities may not be 
related to firms’ operation and spending on 
activities not related to firms’ operations is more 
likely to be curbed. In this case, firms’ CSR activities 
are less likely to be significantly related to stock 
returns, or may even be negatively correlated. 
However, when firms invest in CSR activities 
consistently and strategically, resultant reputation 
enhancement is more likely to increase the value of 
the firms, leading to the recruiting of talented 
employees and a reduction in the possibility of 
lawsuits, etc., as documented in previous studies. In 
this case, firms pursue CSR strategically in relation 
to firms’ operations, and consistently engage in CSR 
activities over long-term periods, which lead to 
higher earnings in the future than in the current 
period. Therefore, when firms engage in CSR 
strategically, investors will expect firms’ earnings to 
be sustained in the future as a result of current 
period earnings change. That is, consistent 
investments in CSR activities are expected to be 
significantly related to stock returns. Therefore, our 
hypothesis is as follows; 
When firms invest in CSR activities strategically 
(consistently), firms’ CSR activities are likely to affect 
firms’ future earnings and be positively related to 
stock returns. 
 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND SAMPLE 
 
3.1. Research methodology and variable 
measurement 
 
The purpose of this study is to address the question 
of whether differential implications of investments 
in CSR activities on firm value exist, and if so, why. 
We address this question using the association 
between annual accounting earnings and stock 
returns. We expect the value relevance of CSR 
activities for firms that consistently engage in CSR, 
to be higher than that for firms that engage 
opportunistically in CSR. We use an earnings 
response coefficient model which examines the 
relationship between stock return and accounting 
earnings to analyse the value relevance of CSR 
activities. Our basic research models are as follows.10 
 
BHRET (SAR) = α + β1UE + β2EDUM + 
β3UE*EDUM + β4LMVE + β5LEV + β6MARGIN 
+ β7MTB +β8NEG + ε 
(1) 
 
BHRET (SAR) = α + β1UE + β2FreqDUM + 
β3UE*FreqDUM + β4LMVE + β5LEV + 
β6MARGIN + β7MTB +β8NEG + ε 
(2) 
 
where: 
BHRET - buy and hold stock return between 
the fourth month of the year and three 
months after fiscal year end. 
SAR - size-adjusted annual cumulative 
abnormal stock return over equally 
weighted market return between the 
fourth month of the year and three 
                                                          
10Teoh and Wong (1993) suggest that interaction variables with unexpected 
earnings and control variables be included in the ERC model. However, 
there exists a multicollearity issue when interaction variables are included 
in our regression model. Therefore, we follow Gelb and Zarowin (2002) 
who include only control variables in their regression.  
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months after fiscal year end. 
UE - unexpected income (difference 
between current year and last year 
incomes) divided by market value. 
EIndex - raw Egyptian Economic Justice Index 
(EEJI) score. 
EDUM - CSR investment dummy variable, 
which is 1 when EEJI score is disclosed 
(top 200), otherwise 0. 
FreqDUM - CSR investment consistency dummy 
variable, which is 1 when EEJI score is 
disclosed equal to or less than one time 
over most recent four years, 0 when the 
score is disclosed equal to or more than 
three times during recent four years. 
LMVE - natural log transformed market 
value at the end of the third month of 
the fiscal year. 
LEV - debt ratio calculated by dividing 
total liabilities by total assets. 
MARGIN - total asset profit ratio calculated by 
dividing net income before taxes by 
total assets. 
MTB - market to book ratio measured at 
the end of third month of the fiscal 
year. 
NEG - loss indicator variable which is 1 
when net loss is reported for the year, 
otherwise 0. 
In these two regression models, we measure 
stock returns by using buy and hold return (BHRET) 
and annual size-adjusted cumulative abnormal stock 
returns (SAR) over an equally weighted market 
index, measured from the beginning of April of the 
current year. To calculate annual size-adjusted 
abnormal stock return over equally weighed market 
index, we form ten portfolios based on total market 
value at the end of the third month of the fiscal 
year. Then we calculate average return on each 
portfolio and subtract from firms’ stock return to 
measure size-adjusted cumulative abnormal return. 
To answer our main hypothesis, we categorise the 
CSR expenditure as managers’ opportunistic 
behaviour or firms’ strategic activities depending on 
the pattern of CSR activities and examine how firm 
value is affected by the pattern of firms’ CSR 
activities. If firms engage in CSR activities due to 
managers’ opportunistic incentives, they may not be 
able to maintain the same level of CSR activities over 
several periods and firm value may not change or 
even decrease, due to the waste of firms’ valuable 
resources. On the other hand, if firms engage in CSR 
activities for strategic reasons, firms are likely to 
maintain the same level of CSR activities over long 
periods and firm value is more likely to increase due 
to CSR activities. 
In model 1, the interaction variable (UE*EDUM) 
between unexpected income (UE) with CSR activity 
dummy variable (EDUM) is our main explanatory 
variable for CSR activity in general. We adopt the 
EEJI index score as CSR activity level of firms, as in 
many other studies such as Chang and Choi (2009) 
and Kostyuk et al. (2013). Based on the 
predetermined rules, the Citizens’ Coalition for 
Economic Justice Institute in Egypt selects firms on 
which it calculates an individual EEJI index score out 
of all the listed firms in Egypt each year and 
discloses the top 200 firms based on the EEJI score.11 
We dichotomise our sample into firms that engage in 
CSR activities and firms that do not, depending on 
whether the EEJI score is disclosed or not, and 
compare the effect of CSR activities on firm value in 
model 1. If firms’ CSR activities do benefit firms in 
general, the coefficient on the interaction variable 
(UE*EDUM) between unexpected income (UE) with 
CSR activity dummy variable (EDUM) is expected to 
be significantly positive in the regression. That is, 
the coefficient will show whether firms’ CSR 
activities do have an incremental effect on the 
relation between earnings change and stock return 
and there by firm value. 
In model 2, our interest variable is the CSR 
frequency variable (FreqDUM) which indicates the 
frequency of CSR activity levels. When firms invest 
in CSR activities for strategic reasons and long-term 
sustainable growth, they are expected to maintain a 
high level of CSR activities. However, firms are more 
likely to seldom show high levels of CSR activities. 
We calculate the CSR frequency dummy (FreqDUM) 
based on the number of times a firm’s EEJI index 
score is disclosed. Specifically, we first count the 
number of years that a firm’s EEJI score is disclosed 
to the public in the past four years, including the 
current year, and assign a CSR frequency variable 
value as one when a firm’s EEJI score is disclosed 
equal to or less than one time during the past four 
years, zero when firm’s EEJI score is disclosed equal 
to or more than three times during the past four 
years. If the coefficient on the interaction variable 
(UE*FreqDUM) between unexpected earnings (UE) 
and the CSR activity frequency variable (FreqDUM) is 
significantly negative, we can infer that investors 
interpret the change in reported earnings for firms 
that have engaged in CSR activities opportunistically, 
and creates agency problems, are temporary, and 
discount the stock price. That is, when managers use 
CSR activities for their personal benefits (or 
opportunistically) firms do not receive the benefits 
of CSR activities. 
Because many previous studies show that 
earnings response coefficients are affected by firm 
size, financial characteristics, growth and risk 
factors (Teoh, 1993; Ayers, 2002), we control for 
firm size, leverage, profitability, book to market 
ratio and loss dummy in our regressions. Firm size 
(LMVE) is measured by total market value as of the 
end of the third month of the fiscal year. As firm 
size becomes larger, investors are more likely to 
have more information because large firms disclose 
more information. Therefore, we add firm size to 
control for information environment effect on the 
                                                          
11In this study, we use the EEJI index score from the Citizens’ Coalition for 
Economics Justice Institute in Egypt as a proxy for the level of CSR 
performance score. The Citizens’ Coalition for Economics Justice Institute 
develops an index which measures the social contribution of corporate 
activities for listed firms in the Egyptian stock market since 2005 and 
discloses the scores of the top 200 firms. The EEJI index score consists of the 
following seven components; soundness, fairness, contribution to social 
service, customer protection, environmental protection, employee 
satisfaction, and contribution to economic development. Each component is 
also comprised of several subcomponents, of which different weights are 
fairly and objectively assigned in advance. Our study uses total scores of 
EEJI index which shows firms’ comprehensive CSR activities. 
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earnings response coefficient. Leverage (LEV) is also 
included because firms with high leverage tend to be 
high risk, which affects the relation between 
earnings and stock returns. We measure leverage by 
dividing total liabilities by total assets. Because the 
market to book ratio (MTB) could imply the 
profitability or growth potential of firms, we include 
it in our regressions. Finally, we add a net loss 
dummy variable (NEG) which indicates whether 
firms report loss because the market reactions to 
reporting net loss are different to reporting net 
income (Hayn, 1995). 
 
3.2. Sample selection 
 
We use firms listed in the Egyptian Stock Market 
(ESM) between 2009 and 2014. We calculate stock 
return by using monthly stock returns provided by 
EsmGuide.12 Financial statement data are extracted 
from EGX database.13 Following are specific sample 
selection criteria: 
- Firms listed in the Egyptian stock market in 
periods over 2009 to 2014; 
- Firms whose EEJI index score is available; 
- Firms of which the financial and stock price data 
are available from EsmGuide and EGX database; 
- Firms not in the financial industries; 
- Firms with December fiscal year end. 
We exclude firms in the financial industries 
because those firms are different from firms in 
other industries such as manufacturing industries in 
characteristics of operation and financial structures. 
We only use firms with December year end to ensure 
homogeneity in our sample firms in the analysis. 
Also, we exclude firm-year observations from our 
sample when any of the data we use is not available. 
 
Table 1. Sample Distribution 
 
Panel A. Distribution by year 
Year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total 
# of obs. 327 288 299 295 315 338 1,862 
Percentage 
(%) 
17.56 15.47 16.06 15.84 16.92 18.15 100.00 
Panel B. Distribution by Industry (ESIC) 
Industry 
# of 
obs. 
Percentage 
(%) 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 8 0.43 
Manufacturing 1,294 69.50 
Electricity, gas, steam and water 
supply 
42 2.25 
Construction 160 8.59 
Wholesale and retail trade 141 7.57 
Transportation 56 3.01 
Information and communications 48 2.58 
Professional, scientific and technical 
activities 
100 5.37 
Education 3 0.16 
Arts, sports, and recreation related 
services 
7 0.38 
Membership organizations, repair and 
other personal services 
3 0.16 
Total 1,862 100.00 
                                                          
12EsmGuide is the database which provides stock returns and analyst 
forecasts for firms listed in the Egyptian Stock Markets 
(http://www.mubasher.info/countries/EG). 
13EGX database provides financial statement data for firms listed in the 
Egyptian Stock Markets (http://www.egx.com.eg/). 
 
Table 1 shows the distribution of the samples 
used in this study by year and industry. The total 
number of samples is 1,862 firm-years, and samples 
are almost evenly spread over the sample period, as 
shown in panel A of Table 1. Panel B shows the 
distribution of the sample based on industry 
classification by the Sections of Egyptian Standard 
Industry Classifications (ESIC). Most of the sample 
firms are in the manufacturing industries, 69.50%, 
followed by construction and wholesale and retail 
industries, 8.59% and 7.57%, respectively. Because 
sample firms are well spread over years and 
industries, there is less likely to be sample selection 
bias. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1. Descriptive statistics and correlation among 
variables 
 
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for 
variables used in this study. We winsorize the value 
of variables which have top and bottom 1% value to 
control for the effect of extreme values of the 
parameters. CSR investment indicator dummy 
variable (EDUM) is determined based on total EEJI 
score, i.e., 1 when a firm ranks top 200 out of all 
listed firms, otherwise 0. 
As Table 2 shows, two dependent variables, buy 
and hold return (BHRET) and equally weighted size-
adjusted annual cumulative abnormal return (SAR), 
have the distribution skewed to the right. The 
average and median of buy and hold return (BHRET) 
are 33.7% and 22.4%, and the average and median of 
size-adjusted abnormal return (SAR) are 10.9% and 
3.1%, respectively. The average and median of 
unexpected earnings (UE) are close to zero, 0.051 
and 0.014 respectively, and standard deviation is 
0.204. The total EEJI index score (EIndex) shows the 
average of 45.292, median of 45.155, implying this 
variable is evenly distributed. Among control 
variables, firm size (LMVE), profitability (MARGIN), 
and market to book ratio (MTB) are overall skewed 
to the right, and leverage (LEV) is skewed to the left. 
Table 3 presents the correlations among 
primary variables used in this study. The buy and 
hold returns (BHRET) and size-adjusted annual 
cumulative abnormal return (SAR) show significantly 
positive correlations with unexpected earnings at the 
1% level. The buy and hold return (BHRET) has 
significantly negative correlations with total EEJI 
index score (EIndex) and CSR investment dummy 
(EDUM) at the 5% level, size-adjusted annual 
cumulative abnormal return (SAR) shows no 
significant correlation with these two variables. Also, 
most other control variables in the ERC regression 
model show significant correlations with the 
dependent variables. This result implies there is no 
significant multicollinearity problem in our sample. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Min. 25% Median 75% Max. 
BHRET 1,862 0.337 0.572 -0.575 -0.036 0.224 0.592 2.502 
SAR 1,862 0.109 0.509 -0.937 -0.208 0.031 0.318 2.167 
UE 1,862 0.051 0.204 -0.465 -0.027 0.014 0.080 1.144 
EIndex 1,862 45.292 3.524 35.330 42.879 45.155 47.644 57.151 
EDUM 1,862 0.602 0.490 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
FreqDUM 1,480 0.586 0.493 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
LMVE 1,862 25.535 1.719 22.707 24.275 25.188 26.454 30.264 
LEV 1,862 0.419 0.176 0.077 0.283 0.424 0.554 0.788 
MARGIN 1,862 0.081 0.065 -0.083 0.036 0.070 0.116 0.297 
MTB 1,862 0.837 0.674 0.142 0.392 0.628 1.001 3.558 
NEG 1,862 0.042 0.200 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Table 3. Correlation among variables 
 
 BHRET SAR UE EIndex EDUM 
 
Freq 
DUM 
LMVE LEV MAR GIN MTB 
SAR 
0.811 
(0.00) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UE 
0.387 
(0.00) 
0.334 
(0.00) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EIndex 
-0.056 
(0.02) 
-0.022 
(0.34) 
-0.053 
(0.02) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EDUM 
-0.057 
(0.01) 
-0.024 
(0.29) 
-0.077 
(0.00) 
0.775 
(0.00) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Freq 
DUM 
0.172 
(0.00) 
0.073 
(0.00) 
0.142 
(0.00) 
-0.650 
(0.00) 
-0.685 
(0.00) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LMVE 
-0.208 
(0.00) 
-0.080 
(0.00) 
-0.157 
(0.00) 
0.536  
(0.00) 
0.395 
(0.00) 
-0.462 
(0.00) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LEV 
0.064 
(0.01) 
0.071 
(0.00) 
0.063 
(0.01) 
-0.209  
(0.00) 
-0.157 
(0.00) 
0.143 
(0.00) 
0.047 
(0.04) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MARGI
N 
0.157 
(0.00) 
0.176 
(0.00) 
0.284 
(0.00) 
0.314  
(0.00) 
0.232 
(0.00) 
-0.209 
(0.00) 
0.276 
(0.00) 
-0.287 
(0.00) 
 
 
 
 
MTB 
-0.288 
(0.00) 
-0.162 
(0.00) 
-0.152 
(0.00) 
0.307  
(0.00) 
0.229 
(0.00) 
-0.276 
(0.00) 
0.579 
(0.00) 
0.122 
(0.00) 
0.254 
(0.00) 
 
 
NEG 
-0.129 
(0.00) 
-0.088 
(0.00) 
-0.240 
(0.00) 
-0.069  
(0.00) 
-0.066 
(0.01) 
0.036 
(0.16) 
-0.018 
(0.45) 
0.115 
(0.00) 
-0.386 
(0.00) 
0.029 
(0.22) 
Note: P-values are in parentheses. 
4.2. Multivariate regression results 
 
In this section, we present the multiple regression 
results that tested hypothesis described in section 2. 
We provide the multiple regression results for the 
relation between CSR activities and earnings change 
in Table 4.  
 
 
Table 4. Regression results for the relation between CSR investment and stock returns 
 
Indep. Variables 
Pred. 
sign 
Dependent Var. = BHRET Dependent Var. = SAR 
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Intercept +/– 1.008 *** 3.07 0.074 0.22 
UE + 0.613 *** 8.58 0.528 *** 7.30 
EDUM + 0.004 0.17 0.015 0.59 
UE*EDUM + 0.287 *** 2.70 0.294 *** 2.74 
LMVE – -0.014 -1.64 0.004 0.47 
LEV + 0.425 *** 5.95 0.415 *** 5.73 
MARGIN + 1.393 *** 6.52 1.627 *** 7.52 
MTB – -0.171 *** -8.05 -0.185 *** -8.62 
NEG +/– 0.096 * 1.65 0.095 1.61 
Year fixed effect  Yes  Yes  
Industry fixed effect  Yes  Yes  
Adj. R2  0.3762  0.1933  
F-Value  49.80  20.39  
# of Samples  1,862  1,862  
Note: ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, based on two-tailed 
tests. 
 
In the table, the coefficients on unexpected 
earnings for both stock return variables (BHRET and 
SAR) are 0.613 and 0.528, respectively, which are 
significant at the 1% level. The coefficient on our 
interest variable (UE*EDUM), interaction variable 
between unexpected earnings (UE) and CSR 
investment indicator variable (EDUM), is 0.287 (t-
stat=2.70) when a dependent variable is the buy and 
hold return (BHRET), and 0.294 (t-stat=2.74) when a 
dependent variable is size-adjusted annual 
cumulative abnormal return (SAR), respectively. Both 
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coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% 
level.  
This result suggests that firms’ investment in 
CSR are likely to generate more earnings in the 
future and thereby increase firm value through good 
customer relations, reputation enhancement, etc., as 
we predicted. Other control variables also generally 
show correlations consistent with our expectation in 
the regressions. The coefficients on firm size (LMVE) 
are negative in both regressions as expected, 
although not significant. Leverage (LEV) and 
profitability (MARGIN) are significantly positively 
related with stock returns at the 1% level. Market to 
book ratio (MTB) shows significantly negative 
coefficients in both regressions. Net loss dummy 
variable (NEG) shows slightly negative coefficient in 
the buy and hold return regression and slightly 
positive coefficient in size-adjusted stock return 
regression. 
 
BHRET (SAR) = α + β
1
UE + β
2
EDUM + 
β
3
UE*EDUM + β
4
LMVE + β
5
LEV + β
6
MARGIN + 
β
7
MTB + β
7
NEG + ε 
(3) 
 
Table 5 presents the results of multiple 
regressions for our main hypothesis. Table 5 shows 
that the coefficients on unexpected earnings (UE) are 
0.864 and 0.739 in both regressions, respectively, 
which are significant at the 1% level. The interest 
variable in the test (UE*FreqDUM), the interaction 
variable between unexpected earnings and the 
frequency of CSR investment of firms, show 
significantly negative coefficients in both buy and 
hold return (BHRET) and size-adjusted annual 
cumulative abnormal return (SAR) regressions. 
The coefficients are -0.447 and -0.454, 
respectively, which are both significant at the 1% 
level. Because this variable measures whether firms 
consistently invest in CSR activities for several years, 
this implies that when firms do not invest in CSR 
consistently, firm value does not increase or even 
decrease, while firm value could increase when firms 
engage in CSR consistently. The results for other 
control variables are similar to those in Table 4. 
Leverage (LEV) and profitability (MARGIN) show 
significantly positive correlations in both 
regressions at 1% level, and market to book value 
ratio (MTB) also shows significantly negative 
relations at 1% level. Net loss dummy (NEG) is not 
statistically significant even though it shows positive 
coefficients in both regressions. 
 
BHRET (SAR) = α + β
1
UE+ β
2
FreqDUM + 
β
3
UE*FreqDUM + β
4
LMVE + β
5
LEV + β
6
MARGIN 
+ β
7
MTB + β
8
NEG + ε 
(4) 
 
 
Table 5. Regression results for the relation between the sustainability of CSR activities and stock 
returns 
 
Indep. Variables 
Pred. 
sign 
Dependent Var. = BHRET Dependent Var. = SAR 
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Intercept +/– 0.333 0.69 0.240 0.50 
UE + 0.864 *** 5.18 0.739 *** 4.47 
FreqDUM – 0.063 ** 2.08 0.054 * 1.79 
UE*FreqDUM – -0.447 ** -2.57 -0.454 *** -2.63 
LMVE – 0.007 0.66 -0.005 -0.54 
LEV + 0.453 *** 5.32 0.386 *** 4.57 
MARGIN + 1.312 *** 5.18 1.428 *** 5.69 
MTB – -0.134 *** -5.76 -0.134 *** -5.80 
NEG +/– 0.030 0.44 0.020 0.30 
Year fixed effect  Yes  Yes  
Industry fixed effect  Yes  Yes  
Adj. R2  0.3658  0.1556  
F-Value  29.73  10.18  
# of Samples  1,047  1,047  
Note: 1) ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, based on two-tailed 
tests; 2) CSR investment consistency dummy variable equals 1 when EEJI score is disclosed more than three times over 
most recent four years, otherwise 0. 
5. SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
 
5.1. Pattern in CSR activities of firms 
 
We argue that firm value will be increased when 
firms consistently engage in CSR activities, because 
consistent CSR activities are likely to enhance firm 
reputation and successful recruitment of talented 
employees, and decrease or remain unchanged when 
firms engage in CSR for opportunistic purposes, and 
present test results consistent with our hypothesis 
in the previous section. To test the sensitivity of our 
results, we analyse how the results are affected by 
the inclusion and exclusion of firms in the Top 200 
EEJI index firms over two consecutive years, and 
present the results in Table 6. We categorise firms 
which have an EEJI index score into four groups as 
follows: First, each year we dichotomise firms with 
an EEJI score as firms with high level CSR activities 
(High) and low level CSR activities (Low) depending 
on whether firms are included in Top 200 firms in 
the EEJI index or not. Second, we assign firms to one 
of the following four groups, HH, LH, HL, LL based 
on the CSR activity levels of two consecutive years. If 
firms are included in the high group for two 
consecutive years, they are assigned to the HH 
group. If firms show a low level of CSR activities in 
the previous year and a high level of CSR activities in 
the current year, they are assigned to the LH group. 
If firms show a high level of CSR activities in the 
previous year and a low level of CSR activities in the 
current year, they are assigned to the HL group. If 
firms show a low level of CSR activities for two 
consecutive years, they are categorised as belonging 
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in the LL group. We expect the larger coefficients of 
unexpected earnings on stock returns for firms in 
the HH group, because these firms are more likely to 
invest in CSR for strategic reasons rather than for 
managers’ opportunistic reasons. By the same token, 
we expect the smaller coefficients for firms in the LL 
group while the magnitude of the coefficients for 
firms in the HL and LH groups is expected to be in 
between the HH and LL groups. 
Panel A of Table 6 shows the results of multiple 
regressions that analysed the relationship between 
unexpected earnings (UE) and buy and hold returns 
(BHRET) within these groups. The coefficients on 
unexpected earnings (UE) are all significantly 
positive at the 1% level in four groups. Consistent 
with our hypothesis, the coefficient on UE in HH 
group is the largest (1.136, t-stat=9.57), and those in 
LL group is the smallest (0.461, t-stat=4.83). In panel 
B of Table 6, which presents the results of size-
adjusted abnormal return regression, all the results 
are qualitatively similar to the results in panel A of 
Table 6. These results imply that investors interpret 
earnings information by firms in the HH group as 
having higher sustainability than firms in the LL 
group, because firms that consistently engage in CSR 
activities at a high level improve a firm’s good 
reputation, attract highly talented employees, and 
thus increases firm value. 
 
 
Table 6. Multiple regression results by change patterns in CSR investment 
 
Panel A. When dependent variable is buy-and-hold return (BHRET) 
Variables sign 
High High 
(HH) 
Low High 
(LH) 
High Low 
(HL) 
Low Low 
(LL) 
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Intercept +/– 0.507 1.10 1.031 1.43 -0.156 -0.19 2.354*** 3.10 
UE + 1.136*** 9.57 0.833*** 5.78 0.885*** 4.01 0.461*** 4.83 
LMVE – -0.012 -1.13 -0.002 -0.08 0.013 0.42 -0.050** -2.31 
LEV + 0.508*** 4.96 0.260 1.44 0.144 0.57 0.368*** 2.61 
MARGIN + 0.993*** 3.48 1.352*** 2.81 0.238 0.29 2.168*** 4.51 
MTB – -0.126*** -4.75 -0.197*** -3.53 -0.232** -2.58 -0.228*** -4.72 
NEG +/– 0.159* 1.74 0.221 1.40 0.028 0.21 0.082 0.70 
Year  fixed  fixed  fixed  fixed  
Industry  fixed  fixed  fixed  fixed  
Adj. R2  0.402  0.371  0.413  0.339  
F-Value  27.49  10.34  7.13  15.94  
Obs(N)  788  333  158  583  
Panel B. When dependent variable is size-adjusted cumulative abnormal return (SAR) 
Variables sign 
High High 
(HH) 
Low High 
(LH) 
High Low 
(HL) 
Low Low 
(LL) 
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Intercept +/– 0.044 0.09 -0.107 -0.15 -1.110 -1.34 0.411 0.54 
UE + 1.028*** 8.50 0.750*** 5.06 0.698*** 3.17 0.429*** 4.48 
LMVE – -0.012 -1.13 0.020 0.91 0.041 1.29 0.007 0.30 
LEV + 0.475*** 4.55 0.281 1.52 0.096 0.38 0.388*** 2.74 
MARGIN + 1.190*** 4.10 1.841*** 3.72 0.665 0.81 2.106*** 4.37 
MTB – -0.139*** -5.15 -0.205*** -3.58 -0.248*** -2.77 -0.227*** -4.67 
NEG +/– 0.127 1.37 0.251 1.55 0.063 0.46 0.072 0.62 
Year  fixed  fixed  fixed  fixed  
Industry  fixed  fixed  fixed  fixed  
Adj. R2  0.192  0.204  0.170  0.192  
F-Value  10.36  5.06  2.79  7.91  
Obs(N)  788  333  158  583  
Note: 1) ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, based on two-tailed 
tests; 2) When firms’ EEJI index scores are disclosed, i.e, top 200, they are assigned to High group, otherwise assigned 
to Low group. 
 
5.2. Analysis by the variance of EEJI index scores 
 
When we measure the consistency of CSR activities 
as the frequency of CSR activity level, firms that 
engage in CSR activities consistently with a strategic 
purpose, but invest in a relatively low level, may be 
categorised as firms that do not engage in CSR 
activities. To avoid this problem, we measure the 
consistency of CSR activities as the variance of EEJI 
index scores. When we use the variance of EEJI index 
scores as the consistency of CSR activities, firms 
that engage in strategic CSR activities with a small 
investment, will be categorised as firms that engage 
in CSR consistently. 
Table 7 provides the results of the regressions 
based on the variance of EEJI index scores. After we 
calculate the variance of EEJI index scores of a firm 
using available data in the sample, we categorise 
samples into high, middle, and low level variance 
groups depending on the magnitude of variance and 
examine the magnitude of the coefficients on the 
interaction variable between unexpected earnings 
and the CSR activity level dummy (UE*EDUM). If 
firms have all six year data, six EEJI scores are used 
in variance calculation, while the smaller number of 
observations is used in variance calculation when 
firms are included in the sample for less than six 
years. When firms engage in CSR activities 
opportunistically, the variance of firms CSR activity 
level is expected to be large because it is very 
difficult to maintain the same level of CSR activity 
when CSR activities are engaged in for personal 
purposes. That is, we interpret smaller CSR variance 
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as evidence of CSR for firms’ sustainable growth or 
strategic purposes. 
Panel A of Table 7 shows the results of multiple 
regressions when the dependent variable is buy and 
hold returns (BHRET). In all three groups, 
unexpected earnings (UE) show a significant positive 
correlation with stock returns, consistent with the 
results in the previous tests and studies. Our 
interest variable, interaction variable between 
unexpected earnings and CSR activity level dummy 
(UE*EDUM), shows a significantly positive coefficient 
at the 5% level in the low variance group 
(coeff.=0.408, t-stat=2.13) and the 10% level in the 
middle variance group (coeff.=0.370, t-stat=1.87), 
and an insignificant coefficient in the high variance 
group, even though all coefficients are positive. 
These results suggest that investors interpret that 
unexpected earnings for firms with a low variance in 
CSR activities are more likely to be permanent, while 
unexpected earnings for firms with a high variance 
in CSR activities are more likely to be temporary. 
These results complement the results in our main 
tests. Panel B of Table 7, which presents the results 
of size-adjusted returns, also shows similar results 
to buy and hold returns regressions. 
 
 
Table 7. Multiple regression results by variance groups based on EEJI index scores 
 
Panel A. When dependent variable is buy-and-hold return (BHRET) 
Variables 
Pred 
sign 
Low Variance 
Group 
Medium Variance 
Group 
High Variance 
Group 
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Intercept +/– 0.628 1.38 0.490 1.12 0.859 * 1.84 
UE + 0.640 *** 5.45 0.679 *** 4.85 0.769 *** 5.46 
EDUM + 0.005 0.11 0.048 1.06 -0.018 -0.40 
UE*EDUM + 0.408 ** 2.13 0.370 * 1.87 0.188 0.99 
LMVE – -0.005 -0.37 -0.015 -1.00 -0.001 -0.09 
LEV + 0.432 *** 3.53 0.512 *** 4.28 0.349 ** 2.41 
MARGIN + 1.137 *** 3.08 1.566 *** 4.11 1.119 *** 2.85 
MTB – -0.155 *** -4.44 -0.163 *** -4.53 -0.225 *** -5.09 
NEG +/– 0.038 0.33 0.192 ** 2.01 0.096 0.95 
Year fixed effect  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry fixed effect  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adj. R2  0.3576  0.4138  0.4111  
F-Value  16.64  21.00  21.66  
# of Samples  591  596  593  
Panel B. When dependent variable is size-adjusted cumulative abnormal return (SAR) 
Variables 
Pred 
sign 
Low Variance 
Group 
Medium Variance 
Group 
High Variance 
Group 
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Intercept +/– -0.839 * -1.84 -0.574 -1.29 -0.033 -0.07 
UE + 0.546 *** 4.63 0.582 *** 4.08 0.664 *** 4.64 
EDUM + 0.020 0.44 0.064 1.39 -0.003 -0.06 
UE*EDUM + 0.352 * 1.83 0.399 ** 1.97 0.212 1.10 
LMVE – 0.013 0.92 0.006 0.40 0.014 0.87 
LEV + 0.449 *** 3.66 0.451 *** 3.70 0.335 ** 2.29 
MARGIN + 1.452 *** 3.92 1.869 *** 4.82 1.198 *** 3.01 
MTB – -0.172 *** -4.90 -0.192 *** -5.22 -0.232 *** -5.18 
NEG +/– 0.044 0.37 0.167 * 1.72 0.096 0.93 
Year fixed effect  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry fixed effect  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adj. R2  0.2088  0.2177  0.1997  
F-Value  8.416  8.886  8.387  
# of Samples  591  596  593  
Note: 1) ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, based on two-tailed 
tests; 2) Samples are divided into Low Variance Group, Medium Variance Group, and High Variance Group based 
on the variance of EEJI index score during sample period. 
 
5.3. Subsequent accounting performance of CSR 
activities 
 
The results of this study imply that consistent 
investments in CSR activities may increase 
accounting earnings and firm value. Prior research 
provides evidence consistent with socially 
responsible firms providing better financial long-
term performance than other firms (Pava, 1996; 
Waddock, 1997; Roberts, 2002; Pozzoli and 
Romolini, 2013). Accordingly, firms’ consistent 
investments in CSR activities as a corporate strategy 
are expected to show higher performances in the 
future periods. 
Using three accounting performance measures 
such as return on equity (ROE3), sales growth (S3), 
and earnings growth (G3), we examine whether 
strategic CSR activities are associated with better 
firm performance in future periods. Panel A of Table 
8 shows the results of multiple regressions that 
investigate the relationship between each 
performance indicator and CSR activity dummy 
variable (EDUM). Consistent with our expectations, 
the interest variable (EDUM) has significantly 
positive coefficients in both future ROE and sales 
growth except for earnings growth. Panel B of Table 
8 provides the results of the relationship between 
accounting performance and the frequency of CSR 
investment of firms. We find that our variable of 
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interest (FreqDUM) is significantly negatively 
correlated with future ROE and earnings growth, 
which supports our projection. Taken together, 
these results suggest that CSR activities in general 
have an effect on better accounting performance in 
future periods, but that the effect of CSR is relatively 
weaker when firm insiders such as managers and 
large shareholders spend corporate resources on 
CSR activities for private benefits. 
 
 
Table 8. Multiple regression results for the effect of CSR activities on the subsequent accounting 
performance 
 
Panel A. When the interest variable is EDUM 
Variables 
Pred 
sign 
PERF. = ROE3 PERF. = S3 PERF. = G3 
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Intercept +/– 0.209 0.86 0.644 *** 3.07 0.055 1.38 
EDUM + 0.083 *** 4.41 0.033 ** 2.00 0.003 0.87 
lnTA + 0.032 *** 5.02 -0.001 -0.19 0.001 0.76 
LEV +/– 0.085 1.61 0.245 *** 5.33 0.000 -0.05 
Year fixed effect  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry fixed effect  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adj. R2  0.0794  0.7916  0.3720  
F-Value  9.79  9.76  4.94  
# of Samples  1,836  1,836  1,836  
Panel B. When the interest variable is FreqDUM 
Variables 
Pred 
sign 
PERF. = ROE3 PERF. = S3 PERF. = G3 
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Intercept +/– 0.496 * 1.67 0.819 *** 3.15 0.093 * .91 
FreqDUM + -0.113 *** 4.95 -0.011 0.53 -0.011 *** 3.04 
lnTA + 0.033 *** 4.52 0.004 0.66 0.001 1.02 
LEV +/– 0.061 1.05 0.263 *** 5.14 0.000 0.02 
Year fixed effect  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry fixed effect  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adj. R2  0.0966  0.0854  0.0565  
F-Value  9.66  8.56  5.85  
# of Samples  1,459  1,459  1,459  
Note: 1) ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, based on two-tailed 
tests; 2) ROE3 is return on equity measured as total earnings in the subsequent three year, divided by the current 
level of total equity. That is, ROE3=(Earningst+1+Earningst+2+Earningst+3)/Total Equity; S3 is subsequent earnings 
growth measured as average sales in the subsequent three years minus current earnings, divided by the current level 
of total assets. That is, S3={(Salest+1+Salest+2+Salest+3)/3-Salest}/Total Assets; G3 is subsequent earnings growth 
measured as average earnings in the subsequent three years minus current earnings, divided by the current level of 
total assets. That is, G3={(Earningst+1+Earningst+2+Earningst+3)/3-Earningst}/Total Assets; lnTA is natural log of 
total assets; LEV is debt ratio calculated by dividing total liabilities by total assets. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, we examine how investors interpret 
firms’ investments in CSR activities by examining the 
difference in the relationship between accounting 
earnings and stock returns. As a proxy for the level 
of CSR activities, we use the EEJI index announced 
by the Citizens’ Coalition of Economic Justice 
Institute in Egypt. We categorise firms as firms that 
engage in CSR activities at a high level, if the EEJI 
index is disclosed. After we identify the consistency 
of CSR activities based on the number of times that 
firms are included in the disclosure group, we 
analyse the differential effect of CSR activities on 
the earnings response coefficients. 
Our results are as follows; first, firms included 
in the disclosure list for CSR activities show a higher 
positive correlation between unexpected earnings 
and stock returns than firms not included in the EEJI 
list. This implies that firms engaging in CSR 
activities may increase profitability permanently and 
firm value. However, firms that sporadically 
(opportunistically) engage in CSR activities show a 
smaller relationship between unexpected earnings 
and stock returns than firms that consistently invest 
in CSR activities. This suggests that consistent CSR 
activities are likely to increase earnings 
permanently, while sporadic CSR activities are likely 
to hurt a firm’s earnings and thereby firm value. 
This result does not change when the consistency of 
CSR activities is measured by the pattern in the level 
of CSR activities and the variance of level of CSR 
activities, suggesting our results are robust due to 
different measures of the consistency of CSR 
activities. In sum, our results imply that consistent 
CSR activities help firms to increase earnings and 
firm value. 
Our findings offer the following contributions. 
Our paper adds to the mixed results of many 
previous studies that examined the relationship 
between CSR and financial performance. That is, 
when firms or managers invest in CSR activities 
opportunistically, CSR activities may not help to 
enhance financial performance, while CSR activities 
do help to improve financial performance when 
firms invest in CSR strategically. The results of the 
paper helps investors to evaluate and make 
investment decisions when considering the 
effectiveness of firms’ investments in CSR activities 
on profitability. Managers can also use our findings 
to guide their actions when they engage in CSR 
activities. Also, we add one more piece of evidence 
to the literature that CSR activities in general do 
help to improve the financial performance of firms. 
Finally, in a period when many global firms are 
increasing their investment in CSR as international 
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organisations, we hope our study raises the concern 
in our society about the need for more aggressive 
responses to CSR activities and many developed 
countries level up their regulations and standards on 
firm CSR activities and sustainable management. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
1. Aupperle, K. E., Carroll, A. B., and Hatfield, J. D. 
(1985). An Empirical Examination of the 
Relationship between Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Profitability. Academy of 
Management Journal, Vol. 28, pp. 446-463. 
2. Banker, R. D. and Mashruwala, R. (2007). The 
Moderating Role of Competition in the 
Relationship between Nonfinancial Measures and 
Future Financial Performance. Contemporary 
Accounting Research, Vol. 24, pp. 763-793. 
3. Barnea, A. and Rubin, A. (2010). Corporate Social 
Responsibility as a Conflict Between Shareholders. 
Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 97, pp. 71-86. 
4. Bowen, H. (1953). Social Responsibility and 
Accountability. New York: Harper & Low. 
5. Brammer, S. and Millington, A. (2006). Firm size, 
organizational visibility and corporate 
philanthropy: an empirical analysis. Business 
Ethics: A European Review, Vol. 15, pp. 6-18. 
6. Brown, T. J. and Dacin, P. A. (1997). The Company 
and the Product: Corporate Associations and 
Consumer Product Responses. Journal of 
Marketing, Vol. 61, pp. 68-84. 
7. Brown, W. O., Helland, E., and Smith, J. K. (2006). 
Corporate philanthropic practices. Journal of 
Corporate Finance, Vol. 12, pp. 855-877. 
8. Collins, D. W. and Kothari, S. P. (1989). An analysis 
of intertemporal and cross-sectional determinants 
of earnings response coefficients. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, Vol. 11, pp. 143-181. 
9. Davis, K. (1960). Can Business Afford To Ignore 
Social Responsibilities? California Management 
Review, Vol. 2, pp. 70-76. 
10. De Villiers, C. and Alexander, D. (2014). The 
institutionalisation of corporate social 
responsibility reporting. The British Accounting 
Review, Vol. 46, pp. 198-212. 
11. Dhaliwal, D. S., Li, O. Z., Tsang, A. and Yang, Y. G. 
(2011). Voluntary Nonfinancial Disclosure and the 
Cost of Equity Capital: The Initiation of Corporate 
Social Responsibility Reporting. The Accounting 
Review, Vol. 86, pp. 59-100. 
12. Dhaliwal, D. S., Radhakrishnan, S., Tsang, A. and 
Yang, Y. G. (2012). Nonfinancial Disclosure and 
Analyst Forecast Accuracy: International Evidence 
on Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure. The 
Accounting Review, Vol. 87, pp. 723-759. 
13. Edmans, A. (2011). Does the stock market fully 
value intangibles? Employee satisfaction and 
equity prices. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 
101, pp. 621-640. 
14. Friedman, M. (1970). The Social Responsibility of 
Business is to Increase Its Profits. New York Times 
Magazine, Vol. 13, pp. 32-33. 
15. Hemingway, C. A. and Maclagan, P. W. (2004). 
Managers' personal values as drivers of corporate 
social responsibility. Journal of Business Ethics, 
Vol. 50, pp. 33-44. 
16. Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L. and Thaler, R. H. 
(1986). Fairness and the Assumptions of 
Economics. The Journal of Business, Vol. 59, pp. 
285-300. 
17. Kim, Y., Park, M. S., and Wier, B. (2012). Is Earnings 
Quality Associated with Corporate Social 
Responsibility? The Accounting Review, Vol. 87, 
pp. 761-796. 
18. Kostyuk, A., Kostyuk, O, Mozghovyi, Y. and 
Kravchenko, Y. (2013). Corporate Social 
Responsibility Index for Ukrainian Banks: The 
Essentials for Implementation. Corporate 
Ownership & Control, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 434-445. 
19. Landon, S. and Smith, C. E. (1997). The Use of 
Quality and Reputation Indicators by Consumers: 
The Case of Bordeaux Wine. Journal of Consumer 
Policy, Vol. 20, pp. 289-323. 
20. McWilliams, A. and Siegel, D. (2000). Corporate 
social responsibility and financial performance: 
correlation or misspecification? Strategic 
Management Journal, Vol. 21, pp. 603-609. 
21. Michelon, G., Pilonato, S. and Ricceri, F. (2015). 
CSR reporting practices and the quality of 
disclosure: An empirical analysis. Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting, Vol. 33, pp. 59-78. 
22. Momin, M. A. and Parker, L. D. (2013). Motivations 
for corporate social responsibility reporting by 
MNC subsidiaries in an emerging country: The 
case of Bangladesh. The British Accounting 
Review, Vol. 45, pp. 215-228. 
23. Nelling, E. and Webb, E. (2009). Corporate social 
responsibility and financial performance: the 
“virtuous circle” revisited. Review of Quantitative 
Finance and Accounting, Vol. 32, pp. 197-209. 
24. Pathirawasam, C. and Wickremasinghe, G. (2012). 
Ownership Concentration and Financial 
Performance: The Case of Sri Lankan Listed 
Companies. Corporate Ownership & Control, Vol. 
9, No. 4, pp. 170-177. 
25. Pava, M. L. and Krausz, J. (1996). The Association 
between Corporate Social-Responsibility and 
Financial Performance: The Paradox of Social Cost. 
Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 15, pp. 321-357. 
26. Posnikoff, J. F. (1997). Divestment from South 
Africa: They did well by doing good. 
Contemporary Economic Policy, Vol. 15, pp. 76-86. 
27. Pozzoli, M. and Romolini, A. (2013). The Impact of 
Social Reporting on the Performance of Italian 
Social Enterprises. Corporate Ownership & 
Control, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 294-301. 
28. Qiu, Y., Shaukat, A. and Tharyan, R. (2016). 
Environmental and social disclosures: Link with 
corporate financial performance. The British 
Accounting Review, Vol. 48, pp. 102-116. 
29. Roberts, P. W. and Dowling, G. R. (2002). Corporate 
reputation and sustained superior financial 
performance. Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 
23, pp. 1077-1093. 
30. Seo, H. J., Kim, K. W. and Park, J. W. (2015). A 
Study on Relation between Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Profitability-and-Corporate 
Value. International Journal of Business and Social 
Research, Vol. 5, pp. 45-55. 
31. Teoh, S. H. and Wong, T. J. (1993). Perceived 
Auditor Quality and the Earnings Response 
Coefficient. The Accounting Review, Vol. 68, pp. 
346-366. 
32. Uddin, M. (2015). Government Ownership in Stock 
Exchange Listed Corporate Firms: An Empirical 
Study of the United Arab Emirates. Corporate 
Ownership & Control, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 38-54. 
33. Waddock, S. A. and Graves, S. B. (1997). The 
Corporate Social Performance-Financial 
Performance Link. Strategic Management Journal, 
Vol. 18, pp. 303-319. 
34. Wright, P. and Ferris, S. P. (1997). Agency conflict 
and corporate strategy: The effect of divestment 
on corporate value. Strategic Management Journal, 
Vol. 18, pp. 77-83. 
